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Abstract: We study the political economy of social insurance in a world
where individuals differ in both income and risk. Social insurance is fi-
nanced through distortionary taxation and redistributes across income and
risk. Individuals vote on social insurance which they can complement with
insurance bought on the private market. Private insurance is actuarially
fair but suffers from adverse selection which results in a screening equilib-
rium with partial coverage. The equilibrium social insurance is the result of
bi-partisan electoral competition game where parties maximize the utility
of their members. We calculate the equilibrium social insurance offered by
the two parties as well as their equilibrium membership, and study how the
equilibrium outcome is affected by electoral uncertainty, distortions from
taxation, risk aversion and the distribution of risk and income. We then
calibrate the model to US data from the PSID survey. Lastly, we study
how the political demand for social insurance is affected by the possibility
to redistribute through income taxation.
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1 Introduction
Insurance, although being a private good, is often publicly financed. As
for health insurance, a recent OECD report reveals that for many countries
a very high proportion of health spending were accounted for by the state
(OECD Health Data 2001). According to this study in 1998 state spending
as a proportion of total spending on health was 80% in Germany, 89% in
France, 67% in the Netherlands, 67% in Italy, 73% in Austria, and 84%
in Britain. In terms of total spending, Germany spent 10% of GDP on
health, France spent 9.5% but Britain spent just 6.8%. As for pensions,
Börsch-Supan et al.(2001) report that the proportion of retirement bene-
fits coming from public insurance was on average 85% in Germany, 65% in
Great-Britain, 50% in the Netherlands, 45% in the US and 42% in Switzer-
land.
In this paper, we concentrate on cost insurance and study why a ma-
jority of voters may prefer at least part of their insurance to be publicly
financed. We identify two reasons for this: redistribution and efficiency.
Typically, social insurance contributions are not related to risk but rather
to income levels. Social insurance thus implies redistribution in two ways
with mandatory participation. First, there is redistribution from low to high
risks because contributions do not depend on individual’s morbidity or risk:
higher-risk individuals pay less than their expected risk while lower-risk
individuals pay more. Second, since contributions increase with income,
higher-income individuals pay more than lower-income individuals even if
they have the same risk. On the other hand, private insurance premia are
unrelated to income, and private insurers have an incentive to screen clients
according to their riskiness. Private insurance thus does not imply any (ex
ante) redistribution. To accommodate these two sources of redistribution,
we consider in this paper individuals differing both in their income and their
risk of incurring the same damage.
A second reason to prefer social to private insurance is due to the pres-
ence of asymmetric information. It is indeed surprising that most contri-
butions to the literature either ignore the problem of adverse selection by
assuming perfect private insurance or assume pooling private insurance (see
among others, Blomqvist and Horn, 1984; Cremer and Pestieau, 1996; Gou-
veia, 1997; Petretto, 1999; Rochet, 1991). However insurance is plagued with
adverse selection, which makes voluntary insurance inefficient and provides
an efficiency argument for compulsory social insurance.
We study here the situation where individuals vote over the social in-
surance coverage rate, while keeping the opportunity to voluntarily supple-
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ment this coverage rate on the private market. We have already studied this
framework in De Donder and Hindriks (forthcoming). The main distinctive
feature of our model is that we assume away the income effect in the de-
mand for insurance so that we do not get the peculiarity that the poor favor
less social insurance than the middle class. We do this by adopting Yaari
(1987)’s dual theory of choice under uncertainty (i.e., risk aversion without
diminishing marginal utility of income). Beside presenting independent in-
terest, this modelling of risk aversion will allow the derivation of a rich set
of insights that could hardly be obtained with the expected utility model.
We add two dimensions to our previous analysis. The first is that we
assume here that financing public insurance is distortionary. This results
in individuals having interior preferences for social insurance coverage rate.
This is in sharp contrast with our previous analysis, where non distortionary
taxation led to individuals having corner preferences, and so to the impossi-
bility of a top-up system where partial social insurance coexists with private
complementary insurance.
We have also added flesh to the political side of the model. The tra-
ditional Downsian model, where parties are only interested in winning the
elections, predicts that parties will converge to the Condorcet winner (the
option preferred by a majority to any other feasible option) if it exists. Real
world observations suggest that parties do not converge. This can be due to
the combination of two features. First, one can argue that parties are not
only interested in winning the elections, but are also policy-motivated (if
not, why do we talk about “left” and ”right” parties?). Second, parties are
uncertain as to the results of the elections. We add these two features to our
model of electoral competition, assuming that two parties choose their po-
litical platform (the social insurance coverage rate) to maximize the utility
of their members. We further assume that party memberships are endoge-
nous. Following Roemer(2001), we call the political outcome an endogenous
parties Wittman equilibrium (EPWE). We compute the EPWE for differ-
ent distributions of risk and income and analyze the effects of a change in
risk aversion, uncertainty, and distortion on the equilibrium outcome. We
obtain among other results policy divergence that is increasing in the degree
of electoral uncertainty.
The redistributive motive plays a crucial role in the political support for
social insurance. One can claim that, in reality, the tax and transfer system,
and not social insurance, is the mechanism most often used to redistribute
income. We then study how the possibility of redistributing through lin-
ear income taxation would affect the political demand for social insurance.
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We obtain that a higher proportion of tax proceeds redistributed through
transfers leads to a lower social insurance coverage rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the social insur-
ance model. Section 3 studies the Wittman political equilibrium outcome.
Section 4 uses Panel data from the PSID on income levels and health ex-
penditures for a sample of 6863 households and calculates the corresponding
Wittman equilibria. Section 5 extends the model to allow for income tax re-
distribution and analyses its effect on the political equilibrium demand for
social insurance. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The economy is composed of individuals who differ in income w and risk
θ defined as the probability of incurring a damage normalized to one for
all. There is a continuum of individuals, with the characteristics w and θ
continuously distributed on a unit square1 according to a joint distribu-
tion function H(w, θ). The marginal distribution of risks in the popula-
tion is denoted by F (θ), with mean risk θ =
R 1
0 θdF (θ) and median risk
θm = F−1(1/2). Income levels are distributed according to the marginal
distribution function G(w) with mean income w =
R 1
0 wdG(w) and median
income wm = G−1(1/2).
We model individuals’ risk preferences using Yaari (1987)’s theory, which
is dual to the expected utility theory in the sense that it is linear in wealth
but non linear in probabilities. We use this formulation because it allows us
to separate attitude towards risk from attitude towards wealth: with Yaari’s
approach, risk aversion is entirely driven by a transformation of probabilities
whereby bad outcomes are given high weight while good outcomes are given
low weight. The insurance contracts we consider consist of a premium π and
a coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1] which is the proportion of the damage reimbursed.
Following De Donder and Hindriks (forthcoming), the utility function of the
individual of type (w, θ) from insurance contract (π, δ) is
u(π, δ;w, θ) = w − π − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ (1)
where α ≥ 0 is a risk aversion parameter. In words, the individual overes-
timates by a fraction α her expected financial damage. The utility without
insurance is
u(0, 0;w, θ) = w − (1 + α)θ
1This assumption is done to simplify notations. See De Donder and Hindriks (forth-
coming) for arbitrary lower and upperbounds of the distributions.
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and the reservation premium is
r(θ) = (1 + α)θδ. (2)
Therefore risk aversion α in our model takes the form of a relative markup
over the actuarially fair price. Making α independent of w accords with our
desire to disentangle risk aversion from income and will greatly simplify the
analysis by eliminating income effect in the demand of insurance.2
There exist two kinds of insurance in this economy. Compulsory social
insurance offers coverage δ and is financed through income taxation: its price
π(δ, w) is proportional to income (which is observed by the taxing authority)
but independent of individual risks. We assume that income taxation is
distortionary and adopt a short cut formulation for this distortion. More
precisely, for an individual with income w, the social premium (tax bill) is
π(δ, w) = (1 + ηδ) δθw/w for a coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1], with the parameter
η ≥ 0 denoting the deadweight loss from taxation.
Individuals can possibly supplement this social insurance with private
insurance. Individual risks are private information, and insurance firms can
only observe their marginal distribution F (θ). Faced with this adverse se-
lection problem, firms propose insurance contracts differing in coverage rate
to separate buyers according to their risk. Perfect competition between pri-
vate insurers ensures that buyers pay actuarially fair premia. Formally, we
denote by δ(θ) the total coverage for type θ where the extra private coverage
δ(θ) − δ is purchased at a fair price (δ(θ) − δ)θ and satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraints. The corresponding payoff for an individual with
risk θ and income w is,
v(δ;w, θ)
= w(1− (1 + ηδ) δθ/w)− (δ(θ)− δ)θ − (1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ.
We now derive the equilibrium menu of contracts for the private insurers.
In any separating equilibrium, no type θ can benefit from claiming to be a
different type bθ. Thus, the following necessary local incentive compatibility
condition must hold: for all θ ∈ Θ·∂v(δ;w, θ)
∂θˆ
¸
θˆ→θ
= αθδ0(θ)− (δ(θ)− δ) = 0.
2Equation (2) implies that it can be optimal under dual theory to buy full insurance
even above the actuarially fair price. As first pointed out by Mossin(1968), this cannot
be the case with expected utility theory. Casual observation suggests that dual theory is
more in line with reality on this point.
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Hence the separating equilibrium coverage rate function δ(θ) solves the
following differential equation,
δ0(θ) =
δ(θ)
αθ
− δ
αθ
∀θ
Optimality requires setting δ(θ) = 1 for θ = 1 and so, the unique solution
is,
δ(θ) = δ + (1− δ)θ1/α.
Notice that in equilibrium, for all types total coverage is increasing with
social insurance coverage δ since θ1/α < 1 for all θ < 1. Hence private
insurance decisions are affected by the level of social insurance coverage but
there is no complete crowding out of private insurance by social insurance.
Inserting this equilibrium policy into the payoff function we get the in-
direct utility function
v(δ;w, θ) = w(1− (1 + ηδ) δθ/w)− (1− δ)θ1/αθ
−(1 + α)θ(1− (1− δ)θ1/α − δ)
= w(1− (1 + ηδ) δθ/w)− (1− δ)θ (1 + ϕ(α, θ))
where ϕ(α, θ) ≡ α(1− θ1/α) ≥ 0 is the efficiency gain from social insurance
as measured by the extra coverage 1−θ1/α evaluated according to the degree
of risk aversion α.
We now study individual preferences over social insurance. Differentiat-
ing the payoff functions with respect to δ we get
∂v(δ;w, θ)
∂δ
= θ (1 + ϕ(α, θ))− w(1 + 2ηδ)θ/w
and ∂
2v(δ;θ,w)
∂δ2 < 0 so the payoff function is concave with respect to δ for all
(w, θ). We see that although individuals are identified by two characteristics
(θ, w), their preferences over social insurance can be summarized by a single
parameter
t(w, θ) =
w
θ(1 + ϕ(α, θ))
.
We refer to this parameter as a type aggregator (Shapiro, 1999) which is
increasing in w and decreasing in θ. Low type t includes poor and high risk
individuals whereas high type t includes rich and low risk individuals. Using
the type aggregator t, we have
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∂v(δ; t(w, θ))
∂δ
= [
1
t(w, θ)
− (1 + 2ηδ) θ
w
]w
Define t ≡ w/(1 + 2η)θ and t ≡ w/θ, then the optimal amount of public
coverage for a type t(w, θ) individual can be expressed as
δ∗(t(w, θ)) =



1 for t(w, θ) ≤ t
w/θ
2η
h
1
t(w,θ) −
θ
w
i
for t < t(w, θ) < t
0 for t(w, θ) ≥ t
Thus preference for social insurance is decreasing with t. It is lower for
high income and low risk individuals. Also observe that more risk aversion
α increases the efficiency gain from social insurance and leads to higher
preferences for social insurance. Finally, note that t = t when η = 0 leading
to δ∗(t(w, θ)) = {0, 1}: individuals prefer either full public insurance or no
public insurance at all in absence of distortions (see De Donder and Hindriks,
proposition 3).
The utility function is everywhere increasing on δ ∈ [0, 1] for individuals
with t(w, θ) ≤ t, everywhere decreasing for individuals with t(w, θ) ≥ t
and single-peaked with an interior maximum for other individuals. It is
also easily verified that utility functions are symmetric. From the median
voter theorem, the Condorcet winning coverage rate is that preferred by the
individuals with the median value of t(w, θ). This value of the coverage rate
is the equilibrium of a Downsian electoral competition game between two
political parties only interested in winning the elections.
In the following sections we depart from the Downsian model by assum-
ing that parties are not only interested in winning the election but that they
are also policy motivated. In this Wittman model, parties are interested in
maximizing the utility of their members. With this political game we ob-
tain policy divergence contrarily to the Downs model where parties converge
inevitably to the Condorcet winner.
3 Wittman equilibria with endogenous parties
We assume that two political parties (denoted L and R) compete for votes
in an election under the plurality rule. Both parties simultaneously choose
the social insurance coverage rate as their political platform. Individuals
vote for the platform they prefer. The party with the most votes wins the
election and implements its platform.
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Unlike Downsian political competition, we assume that parties have pol-
icy preferences represented by the average utility of their members (see
Wittman, 1973). Without electoral uncertainty, utility-maximizing parties
would inevitably converge to the Condorcet winner as predicted by Downs’
model. Indeed to have any influence on the implemented policy, a party must
win the election and propose the Condorcet winner (if it exists), regardless
of its policy preferences (see Roemer, 2001). To allow parties to depart from
the condorcet winner and no forego any chance of reelection, we must intro-
duce some uncertainty in the electoral outcome. This uncertainty, together
with utility maximizing parties, gives rise to the following trade-off: by de-
parting from the Condorcet winner a party decreases its chances of being
elected but may increase the utility of its members if elected.
Define individual preferences over coverage δ as v(δ; t(w, θ)). Let Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢
be the set of individuals who prefer δ to δ0:
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢
=
©
(w, θ) : v(δ; t(w, θ)) ≥ v(δ0; t(w, θ))
ª
.
Let H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
be the measure of this set. In absence of electoral
uncertainty, this measure would represent the proportion of votes a party
proposing δ would obtain when faced with an opponent advocating δ0. It
seems more in line with reality to assume that parties are uncertain as to the
precise result of the election even after platforms are announced. One reason
may be that platforms are announced months before the elections and that
voters’ views change during the process of debate between parties. Another
possibility is that parties are uncertain as to which voters will turn out
at the pools. To formalize this uncertainty, we use the “error-distribution
model of uncertainty” where parties assume that the proportion of votes for
δ lies in the interval
¡
H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
−∆,H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
+∆
¢
for some ∆ > 0
and is distributed uniformly on this interval (see Roemer, 2001). Thus, the
probability that δ defeats δ0 is3
p
¡
δ, δ0
¢
=



0 if H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
+∆ ≤ 1/2
H(Ω(δ,δ0))+∆−1/2
2∆ otherwise
1 if H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
−∆ ≥ 1/2
For any H
¡
Ω
¡
δ, δ0
¢¢
∈ 12 ± ∆, the probability that δ defeats δ0 is a
smooth function of the policy pair. Party L defeats party R with probability
p
³
δL, δR
´
and is defeated by party R with probability p
³
δR, δL
´
= 1 −
p
³
δL, δR
´
.
3 If δ = δ0, p (δ, δ0) = 1/2.
7
Both parties simultaneously choose a platform in order to maximize the
average utility of their members, given the platform proposed by the other
party. We assume that parties’ preferences is consitent with the dual theory
and take the form of a weighted sum of the average utility of their members,
with a mark-up on the probability that the other party gets elected. Each
party’s membership is endogenous and composed of those individuals who
prefer the party’s platform to the one proposed by its opponent. In an
Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE)
- No party wants to change its platform given the platform of the other
party and its membership;
- No individual wants to change membership given the platforms pro-
posed by the two parties.
We now give the formal definition of an (EPWE). Notice that the set of
agents preferring policy δL to δR (with δL > δR) are those types below the
threshold t◦
³
δL, δR
´
.
Definition 1 An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE) is a
pair
³
δL, δR
´
∈ [0, 1]2 with δL ≥ δR
such that
δL = argmax φ(p
³
δR, δL
´
V L(δR) +
³
1− φ(p
³
δR, δL
´
)
´
V L(δL),
δR = argmax φ(p
³
δL, δR
´
)V R(δL) +
³
1− φ(p
³
δL, δR
´
)
´
V R(δR),
where political risk aversion translates into political parties putting more
weight on the probability of loosing the election φ(p(.)) = (1 + αp)p(.), and
where the utility function of each party is
V L(δ) =
Z
L
v(δ; t(w, θ)) dH(w, θ);
V R(δ) =
Z
R
v(δ; t(w, θ)) dH(w, θ)
with their (endogenous) membership
L =
n
(w, θ) : t (w, θ) ≤ t◦
³
δL, δR
´o
;
R =
n
(w, θ) : t (w, θ) > t◦
³
δL, δR
´o
and the critical type t(w, θ) = t◦
³
δL, δR
´
solving
v(δL; t(w, θ)) = v(δR; t(w, θ)).
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Using our economic model, we can write down explicitly the type t(w, θ) =
t◦
³
δL, δR
´
who is indifferent between δL and δR:
t◦
³
δL, δR
´
=
w/θ
1 + η
³
δL + δR
´
Due to the symmetry of preferences, the critical type is unchanged with
symmetric differentiation of policies. Symmetry further implies that all in-
dividuals with type t(w, θ) ≤ t◦
³
δL, δR
´
prefer δL to δR if δL > δR. Party
L represents low types and party R represents high types.
Each party chooses its policy taking the policy of the other party as given.
The first-order conditions for a Wittman equilibrium policy pair
³
δL, δR
´
are
(1− φ(p
³
δR, δ
´
))
∂V L(δ)
∂δ
−
∂φ(p
³
δR, δ
´
)
∂δ
[V L(δ)− V L(δR)] = 0
(1− φ(p
³
δL, δ
´
))
∂V R(δ)
∂δ
−
∂φ(p
³
δL, δ
´
)
∂δ
[V R(δ)− V R(δL)] = 0
Hence, the effect of a change in the social coverage rate proposed by one
party can be decomposed into the sum of two parts: (i) a change in the
utility level of its members given the set of types choosing to support that
party, and (ii) a change in the set of voters supporting that party and thus
in the chance of its policy being implemented.
We can now calculate the Wittman equilibria. The Tables below re-
port the Wittman equilibria for various distributions of types and different
values of the distortion, risk aversion and uncertainty parameters. Through-
out we assume that w and θ are independently distributed and moreover
that θ is uniformly distributed. In Tables 1a,b, w is uniformly distributed
while in Tables 2a,b, income is distributed according to a positively skewed
Beta(2,5) distribution. Tables 1a and 2a give results with the same eco-
nomic and political risk aversion: α = αp = 0.1. This assumption seems
reasonable since parties merely aggregate the utility of their members. On
the other hand, one can argue that the two parameters concern two dis-
tinct risks: the (economic) risk to incur a damage for α and the (political)
risk of losing the elections for αp. We then report in Tables 1b and 2b
results obtained with a higher political risk aversion αp = 0.3 > α = 0.1.
Each Table covers various degrees of distortion η ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5} and un-
certainty ∆ ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1} For each configuration of parameters, each
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Table reports the Wittman equilibrium policy pair
³
δL, δR
´
, the probability
that party L wins the election, p(δL, δR), and the expected policy outcome,
p
³
δL, δR
´
δL+
³
1− p
³
δL, δR
´´
δR.
First observe that, in absence of uncertainty both parties propose the
Condorcet winning policy δm. When political uncertainty increases, the
equilibrium policies diverge with δL > δm > δR , party L representing
poor/high risk voters who want more social insurance and party R repre-
senting rich/low risk voters who want less social insurance. The intuition
is simply that uncertainty reduces the electoral cost of departing from the
Condorcet winner and enables parties to propose a policy closer to what
they members whish. Not surprisingly, a similar effect arises when political
aversion decreases, since parties then care less about the possibility of losing
election.
We also note that, as long as parties propose interior policies, they attract
the same number of voters and so they tie for winning. This result is not
surprising with symmetric preferences and distribution functions (Tables 1a
and 1b) but is more surprising with a positively skewed distribution of risks
(Tables 2a and 2b). An important consequence is that the expected policy is
not affected by the amount of political uncertainty, but only the equilibrium
platforms proposed by the parties. However with non-interior equilibrium,
the party which is constrained is more likely to win election. The reason is
that such party would have liked to move further away from the Condorcet
winner, even at the cost of a lower probability of winning.
We also obtain that equilibrium policies decrease with the degree of
distortion η of social insurance and increase with economic risk aversion. The
latter effect is driven by the fact that risk aversion (parameter α) increases
everybody’s preferences for social insurance. Finally, comparing Tables 1
and 2, we see that the positive skewness of the income distribution induces
both parties to propose more social insurance in equilibrium. This is because
a higher proportion of voters is below the mean income and benefits from
the income redistribution associated with social insurance.
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Table 1a: Wittman equilibrium with independent and uniform distribu-
tion of income and risk and α = αp = 0.1.
∆ η δL δR p
³
δL, δR
´
E
³
δL, δR
´
0.1 0.1 100% 0% 46.21% 46.21%
0.3 42.88% 0% 39.96% 17.14%
0.5 25.73% 0% 39.96% 10.28%
0.01 0.1 50.39% 33.09% 50% 41.68%
0.3 16.80% 11.03% 50% 13.89%
0.5 10.08% 6.62% 50% 8.34%
0.001 0.1 42.55% 40.78% 50% 41.68%
0.3 14.18% 13.59% 50% 13.89%
0.5 8.51% 8.16% 50% 8.34%
Table 1b: Wittman equilibrium with independent and uniform distribution
of income and risk, α = 0.1 and αp = 0.3.
∆ η δL δR p
³
δL, δR
´
E
³
δL, δR
´
0.1 0.1 96.69% 0.00% 46.96% 45.40%
0.3 32.23% 0.00% 46.96% 15.13%
0.5 19.34% 0.00% 46.96% 9.08%
0.01 0.1 47.44% 35.96% 50% 41.68%
0.3 15.81% 11.99% 50% 13.89%
0.5 9.49% 7.19% 50% 8.34%
0.001 0.1 42.25% 41.08% 50% 41.68%
0.3 14.08% 13.69% 50% 13.89%
0.5 8.45% 8.22% 50% 8.34%
Table 2a: Wittman equilibrium with Beta(2,5) distribution of income,
uniform distribution of risk and α = αp = 0.1
∆ η δL δR p
³
δL, δR
´
E
³
δL, δR
´
0.1 0.1 100% 0% 51.88% 51.88%
0.3 48.78% 0% 42.67% 20.81%
0.5 29.27% 0% 42.67% 12.49%
0.01 0.1 64.65% 44.84% 50% 54.68%
0.3 21.55% 14.95% 50% 18.23%
0.5 12.93% 8.97% 50% 10.94%
0.001 0.1 55.68% 53.65% 50% 54.68%
0.3 18.56% 17.88% 50% 18.23%
0.5 11.14% 10.73% 50% 10.94%
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Table 2b: Wittman equilibrium with Beta(2,5) distribution of income,
uniform distribution of risk, α = 0.1 and αp = 0.3.
∆ η δL δR p
³
δL, δR
´
E
³
δL, δR
´
0.1 0.1 100% 0.00% 51.88% 51.88%
0.3 38.19% 0.45% 48.68% 18.82%
0.5 22.91% 0.27% 48.68% 11.29%
0.01 0.1 61.28% 48.12% 50% 54.68%
0.3 20.43% 16.04% 50% 18.23%
0.5 12.26% 9.62% 50% 10.94%
0.001 0.1 55.34% 54.00% 50% 54.68%
0.3 18.45% 18.00% 50% 18.23%
0.5 11.07% 10.80% 50% 10.94%
In the next section, we calibrate our model using US panel data and
compute the corresponding EPWE.
4 Empirical analysis
We first describe how we have used data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to gather information on income levels and health expen-
ditures for a sample of 6863 households. We then calibrate our model to
calculate the Wittman equilibrium.
4.1 Data on the distribution of risks and incomes
To calibrate our model, we need information on both income and risk distri-
butions. The unit of observation we use is the household. As a measure of
income, we use the 1998 total family income as reported in the 1999 “Income
plus” PSID data base (variable Faminc99). This variable measures the sum
of taxable income of head and wife, transfer income of head and wife, tax-
able and transfer incomes of other family unit members, and social security
income. Among respondents to this question, the average family income is
$52,200 and the median income is $38,300.
As for risks, we concentrate on medical care costs. We first gather
information on medical care costs incurred by these families in 1999 and
2000. These costs are obtained from the 2001 “Core family data” (variable
ER19860) and consist of out-of-pocket costs plus the costs covered by Medi-
care, Medicaid, or other health insurance. The events covered are hospital
12
and nursing home stays, doctor and clinic visits, outpatient surgery, dental
visits, prescriptions, and in-home medical care. We obtain the following
distribution of medical care costs.
Table 3: Distribution of medical care costs in 1999 and 2000
less than 1,000 $ 15.60%
1,000-5,000 $ 31.00%
5,000-25,000$ 34.60%
25,000-100,000$ 9.45%
100,000-500,000$ 1.50%
more than 500,000$ 0.25%
no response 7.60%
We keep in our database the 6863 households who have answered both
questions (on income and health costs). We are not directly interested in
the health costs, but in the risk to incur such costs. Our model uses a binary
description of events (damage or no damage) while the PSID gives us some
information on the size of the damage. To calibrate our model, we consider
that a damage occurs if household medical care costs in 1999 and 2000 are
greater than a threshold. We consider two distinct thresholds: 5,000 $ and
25,000$. For the low threshold, 45.8% of households have incurred a damage,
and this proportion is 11.2% for the high threshold.
For each household, we know its 1998 income and whether it has incurred
a damage in 1999 and 2000. We then translate this binary information
into a probability in 1998 to incur the damage in the following years. We
then compute, for each percentile of the income distribution, the proportion
of households incurring the damage. This proportion is then used as the
proxy for the risk probability of all households in income group. The joint
distribution of risk and income we obtain exhibits a correlation between
income and risk of -0.10 for the low cost definition and 0.08 for the high one.
4.2 Wittman equilibria
Given the discrete distribution of risk and income we cannot use the first-
order approach to calculate the Wittman equilibria. We briefly explain the
algorithm used before reporting our results.
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We exploit the feature of the model that, in equilibrium, the median
type individuals are indifferent between the policies proposed by the two
parties.4 Formally, we calculate the function m(δ) which is such that
v(δ; tm) = v(m(δ); tm)
where tm is the median type. Since preferences are single-peaked, we have
that
δ ≥ δm ⇔ m(δ) ≤ δm
where δm denotes the policy most favored by the median type (i.e. the
Condorcet winner). We know that at equilibrium δL ≤ δm ≤ δR. We then
use the following algorithm.
Step 0: Start with δL = δm.
Step 1: Compute δR = m(δL).
Step 2: Verify that the left party has no incentive to deviate. That is,
study small deviations around δL and compute the impact on the probability
of winning the elections and on the average utility of its members. If the
average utility of its members does not increase for any small deviation
around δL, the EPWE has been found and the procedure stops. If one
deviation at least increases this utility, increase slightly the value of δL and
go back to Step 1.
Using this algorithm, we have calculated the equilibrium policy pair for
different values of the parameters. Table 4 summarizes the results we obtain
with the two definitions of the damage and with two different political risk
aversion.
Table 4: EPWE with PSID data (with α = 0.05, η = 0.4,∆ = 0.1)
αp δL δR δm = E(δL, δR)
Low definition of damage
0 56.7% 39.3% 48%
0.05 55.9% 40.1% 48%
High definition of damage
0 62.8% 12.4% 37.6%
0.05 60.8% 14.4% 37.6%
As previously, we obtain that with political risk aversionthe equilibrium
outcome is closer to the Condorcet winner. Comparing the results obtained
4Equivalently this means that at equilibrium party L’s membership is composed of all
types lower than the median type and party R of all types above the median. Hence, each
party has a 50% chance of winning the elections at equilibrium.
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with the two definitions of the damage, we see that the Condorcet winning
coverage rate decreases when the damage is high, but the policy proposed
by the left party actually increases!
5 Tax and insurance mix
In this section we study how the possibility of redistributing through linear
income taxation would affect the political demand for social insurance. Con-
sider a proportional tax rate T used to finance both a lump sum transfer
G to everyone and insurance coverage δ. In our model there is no income
effect in the demand for insurance and so the utility function of type (w, θ)
is
v(T,λ;w, θ) = (1− T )w +G− (δ(θ)− δ)θ − (1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ
where δ(θ) = δ + (1− δ)θ1/α. We assume a quadratic deadweight loss from
taxation yielding average tax revenue
(1− T
2
)Tw
which is used for redistribution in proportion λ and insurance provision in
proportion 1− λ. It follows that
G = λ(1− T
2
)Tw
δ = (1− λ)(1− T
2
)Tw/θ
Substituting for G and δ into the utility function and rearranging we
have
v(T,λ;w, θ) = (1− T )w + λ(1− T
2
)Tw
−
µ
1−
µ
(1− λ)(1− T
2
)Tw/θ
¶¶
(1 + ϕ)θ. (3)
We have essentially two degrees of freedom: the tax rate T and revenue
share, λ. Once these two are known, we can deduce from the government
budget constraint both the transfer and the provision of social insurance.
We first study the preferences over T .
15
To study the preferences over T , we differentiate (3) with respect to the
tax rate:
∂v(T,λ;w, θ)
∂T
= (1− T )w[λ+ (1− λ) (1 + ϕ) θ/θ]− w
where ϕ ≡ α(1 − θ1/α) ≥ 0 is the efficiency gain from social insurance.
Hence v(T ;w, θ) is single-peaked in T and preferences over taxation can be
summarized by the type aggregator
s(w, θ,λ) =
w
λ+ (1− λ) (1 + ϕ) θ/θ
where those with high s prefers low tax and those with low s prefer high
tax. This type aggregator depends on the value of λ. If λ = 1, tax pro-
ceeds are entirely redistributed in a lump sum way, and only income affects
individual preferences for taxation. When λ decreases, more tax revenue
are used for insurance provision, and individual risk together with income
affect preference for tax. At the limit, when λ = 0, the type aggregator
is the same (up to a multiplicative constant) as in the preceding sections
s(w, θ, 0) = θ¯t(w, θ).
We denote by sm the median value of this type aggregator. The Con-
dorcet winning tax rate as a function of λ is then given by
Tm(λ) = 1−
sm
w¯
and the resulting provision of insurance
δm(λ) = (1− λ)
w¯
2θ¯
Ã
1−
µ
sm
w¯
¶2!
.
The Condorcet tax rate is affected by λ through its effect on the median
type, which depends on the joint distribution of income and risk. Increasing
λ has two effects on the provision of social insurance. First, a direct effect
whereby with a higher λ less tax revenue is available for social insurance.
Second, an indirect effect, through the change in the identity of the median
type. Evidently, if an increase in λ induces a median type who prefers
less taxation both effects reinforce each other and the provision of social
insurance declines as λ increases. Otherwise, the net effect is ambiguous.
We have performed numerical calculations to assess the influence of the
joint distribution of risk and income on Tm(λ), δm(λ) and Gm(λ) under the
assumption that risk and income are independently distributed and risk
uniformly distributed. Progressively increasing the positive skewness of the
income distribution, we obtain :
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• When the skewness is small, Tm(λ) is decreasing and Gm(λ) is single-
peaked.
• When the skewness is high, Tm(λ) is single-peaked and Gm(λ) is in-
creasing.
• For any skewness, δm(λ) is decreasing.
It follows, that the equilibrium level of social insurance declines when
a larger fraction of tax revenue is used for redistribution. There is partial
eviction between social insurance and direct redistribution.
We now turn to the preferences over λ. Differentiating the payoff with
respect to λ, we obtain
∂v(T,λ;w, θ)
∂λ
= (1− T
2
)Tw
µ
1− (1 + ϕ)θ
θ
¶
.
Because this expression is independent of λ voters have corner preferences
on how to allocate tax revenue between redistribution and social insurace. .
Moreover, their preference overλ is also independent of the tax rate T and w.
This is due to the fact that once T is chosen, the tax bill of the individual is
fixed and the transfer received independent of individual characteristics. As
a consequence, voters prefer to redistribute through social insurance if they
benefit enough from it, i.e. if θ ≥ θ(1+ϕ) . We then have that if θm ≥
θ
(1+ϕ)
there is a majority against income redistribution and λ = 0. This will be
the case if the risk distribution is not too positively skewed. In particular,
without efficiency gain from social insurance, voters prefer social insurance
to income redistribution if and only if their risk is higher than the average
risk in the economy.
What can we say about a simultaneous vote over T and λ? Multidi-
mensional vote is very tricky, since it most often results in the absence of a
Condorcet winner (see Plott, 1967). However, the structure of preferences
we have here is very particular, since voters have corner preferences over λ
which are independent of T . We can conclude that, if θm ≥ θ(1+ϕ) and if
a Condorcet winner exists, it involves λ = 0 and Tm(0) = 1 − smw¯ where
the type aggregator is the same (up to a multiplicative constant) as in the
preceding sections: s(w, θ, 0) = θ¯t(w, θ). That is, a majority prefers to redis-
tribute through the provision of social insurance rather than through linear
income taxation. Indeed, any policy bundle (λ0 > 0, T 0) is beaten at the
majority by the policy bundle (0, T 0). Moreover, any policy consisting of
(0, T 0) is majority beaten by (0, Tm(0)). Unfortunately, we cannot conclude
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from this reasoning that a Condorcet winner exists since the policy bundle
(0, Tm(0)) may be defeated by another bundle when λ is increased and the
tax rate decreased simultaneously.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the political support for social insurance
when individuals can buy additional private insurance on a voluntary basis.
Social insurance is financed by a distortionary income tax and redistributes
across income and risk levels. Private insurance is affected by adverse selec-
tion, which translates into partial coverage. Using a dual theory of prefer-
ences under uncertainty, we have shown that although individuals differ in
two characteristics (income and risk), their preferences over social coverage
can be summarized by a single parameter aggregating these two charac-
teristics. Individuals with lower income and higher risk prefer more social
insurance. We have also shown that introducing distortionary taxation re-
sults in at least some individuals preferring a mixed (social plus private)
insurance system.
The classical two-party electoral competition game due to Downs as-
sumes that both parties are only interested in winning the elections. We
replace this assumption by another one that captures the important feature
that parties also care about the utility of their members. This model, first
proposed by Wittman(1973) and then later developed by Roemer(2001),
further assumes that elections are inherently uncertain, (i.e. that parties
cannot perfectly predict the electoral outcome once the platforms have been
announced). Upon choosing their platforms, parties take into account both
the utility their proposition will give to their members if implemented and
the probability of winning the elections with this platform. Moreover, mem-
bership is also in equilibrium: given the platforms, no individual wants to
change its membership.
In absence of electoral uncertainty, both parties would propose the Con-
dorcet winner since it is the only way to affect the policy implemented. This
is also the result of the Downsian electoral competition model. We calculate
the endogenous parties Wittman equilibrium for different parameters values
and show that more electoral uncertainty leads to more differentiation in
the platforms. One party (that we call Left) represents the poor and the
high risk individuals while the other one, dubbed the Right, represents rich
and low risk people. If electoral uncertainty is not too high, equilibrium
platforms are both interior and the equilibrium is symmetrical. That is, the
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median type is indifferent between the parties’ proposals, each party ties
for winning and the expected policy implemented is the Condorcet winner.
Less electoral risk aversion further increases the divergence between plat-
forms. Increasing the skewness of the income distribution leads both parties
to propose a higher social insurance coverage rate, since more people benefit
from the income redistribution underlying social insurance.
We then calibrate the model with US data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics. We define the risk as the probability to incur medical
care costs exceeding a threshold level (with two distinct thresholds). We
obtain that the correlation between income and risk is slightly negative.
Comparing the results obtained with the two thresholds for the damage, we
obtain that the Condorcet winning coverage rate is lower when the damage
threshold is higher, but the coverage rate proposed by the left party actually
increases.
In the last section we study how the possibility of redistributing through
linear income taxation would affect the political demand for social insurance.
We have essentially two decision variables: the tax rate and the share of tax
revenue redistributed through lump sum transfers. We find that increasing
the share of tax revenue used for redistribution reduces the political demand
for social insurance.
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